INTRODUCTION

I intend to argue for an affirmative answer to the question in the title. But why ask it in the first place?

That last query is easy to answer. The axiomatics of internal consistency of choice have been given a central place in many approaches in decision theory, in economics, in game theory, in social choice, in axiomatic choice theory, and in many related disciplines. Many such conditions of internal consistency are standardly used to establish theorems and derive results, and they include axioms of various different types, for example, “the weak axiom of revealed preference,” “the strong axiom of revealed preference,” “basic contraction consistency,” “basic expansion consistency,” “binariness of choice,” “strong independence axiom,” “sure thing principle” (to mention just a few of a very large set of conditions).

The problem that arises immediately is whether a set of choices can be interpreted and seen as consistent or inconsistent without bringing in something external to choice, such as the underlying motivations or objectives or values that are pursued or acknowledged by choice. Hence the question, which – despite a slight air of mud-slinging – is meant as a serious proposal for investigation.

I would also argue that the pragmatic reasons for invoking conditions of internal consistency of choice continue to exist, even though any attempt to defend, or motivate, or indeed properly interpret, these conditions without an external reference is bound to be flawed.