We might, perhaps a little misleadingly, represent my claims about realism and moral inquiry by saying that moral realism is presupposed or supported by certain features of commonsense moral thinking. Now, both those who accept this kind of argument for moral realism and those who do not will often identify another important feature in commonsense moral thinking, namely, the practical or action-guiding character of morality. The practical character of morality is often thought to call for an antirealist, especially noncognitivist, construal of moral claims. If moral judgments merely purported to state facts, it is claimed, they could not fulfill the action-guiding function they do. To fulfill this function, moral judgments must concern or express affective, fundamentally noncognitive, features of people's psychology. It is this sort of antirealist argument that I wish to consider here. I shall argue that, properly understood, the practical or action-guiding character of morality not only fails to undermine the case for moral realism but actually strengthens it.

INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM

Moral considerations are practical in some very important sense. Agents engage in moral deliberation in order to decide what to do and give moral advice with the aim of influencing others' conduct in certain ways. We expect people who accept moral claims or make moral judgments to act in certain ways. We would regard it as odd for people who accepted moral claims about an issue to be completely indifferent about that issue. For these reasons, we expect moral considerations to motivate people to act in certain ways, or at least to provide them with reason to act in those ways.