The Idea of Neutrality

Like any tradition of thought, liberalism is marked by disputes among its adherents as well as by disagreements with its adversaries. Here as elsewhere, one of the continuing objects of internal dispute has been precisely the way this form of political thought should be distinguished from its rivals. There is thus a limited value in trying to discern the “essence” or “guiding spirit” of liberalism. Still, it is not an entirely worthless project. The best approach lies in keeping in mind the basic problems that liberal thought has sought to solve. Some versions of liberalism will then appear more appropriate than others in that they take the problems seriously and construct liberal principles around them. In this perspective, viable forms of liberalism cannot be ones that themselves give rise to these problems.

Since its rise in the sixteenth century, liberal thought has followed those earlier currents of political philosophy that have sought to place the powers of government in the service of moral principle. In contrast to the proponents of raison d'état, therefore, liberal thinkers have argued that there are things governments ought to be prohibited from doing. The nature of these limits has not been simply prudential, as though they merely involved rules of conduct by means of which rulers may continue in power or states remain strong.