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7 - On GL

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

George S. Boolos
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Summary

We here present a number of results about the system GL. Some of these will be of direct interest for the study of provability in PA; others are simply independently interesting (we hope), and these occur toward the end of the chapter. The discussion here of letterless sentences and the notions of rank and trace will be particularly important in the next chapter, where we take up the fixed point theorem, certainly one of the most striking applications of modal logic ever made.

We begin with one of the oldest results of the subject of provability logic, the normal form theorem for letterless sentences. Recall that a modal sentence is called letterless if it contains no sentence letters, equivalently if it is a member of the smallest class containing ⊥ and containing (AB) and □A whenever it contains A and B.

As ever, □0A = A and □i+1A = □□iA.

We shall say that a letterless sentence C is in normal form if it is a truth-functional combination of sentences of the form □i⊥.

The normal form theorem for letterless sentences

If B is a letterless sentence, there is a letterless sentence C in normal form such that GL⊢BC.

Proof. It clearly suffices to show how to construct a letterless sentence in normal form equivalent to □C from a letterless sentence C in normal form.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1994

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  • On GL
  • George S. Boolos, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Book: The Logic of Provability
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625183.009
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  • On GL
  • George S. Boolos, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Book: The Logic of Provability
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625183.009
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • On GL
  • George S. Boolos, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Book: The Logic of Provability
  • Online publication: 08 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625183.009
Available formats
×