Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vsgnj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-23T12:18:51.016Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - ‘Whether’ report

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

David Lewis
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
Get access

Summary

KNOWING WHETHER AND TELLING WHETHER

Mr. Body lies foully murdered, and the suspects are Green, Mustard, Peacock, Plum, Scarlet, and White. We may take it as settled that one of them did it, and only one. The question is whether Green did it, or Mustard did it, or Peacock, or Plum, or Scarlet, or White. Holmes is on the scene.

If Green did it, then Holmes knows whether Green did it or … or White did it if and only if he knows that Green did it. Likewise if Mustard did it, then Holmes knows whether … if and only if he knows that Mustard did it. Likewise for the other cases. In short, Holmes knows whether … if and only if he knows the true one of the alternatives presented by the ‘whether’-clause, whichever one that is.

Similarly for telling. In at least one principal sense, Holmes tells Watson whether Green did it, or Mustard did it, or Peacock, or Plum, or Scarlet, or White, if and only if Holmes tells Watson the true one of the alternatives presented by the ‘whether’-clause. That is: if and only if either Green did it and Holmes tells Watson that Green did it, or … or White did it and Holmes tells Watson that White did it.

This is a veridical sense of telling whether, in which telling falsely whether does not count as telling whether at all, but only as purporting to tell whether.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1997

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • ‘Whether’ report
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Philosophical Logic
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625237.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • ‘Whether’ report
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Philosophical Logic
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625237.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • ‘Whether’ report
  • David Lewis, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Papers in Philosophical Logic
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625237.005
Available formats
×