It is hardly disputable that nowadays the overwhelming majority of philosophers study the history of their field, at least part of the time. In this respect other disciplines behave differently, and there was a time when philosophers behaved differently, too. Are there good reasons for the change? Do we know those reasons? Do we have well-founded and agreed views on why and for what purpose we, the majority of philosophers or the profession in general, study the history of philosophy? I do not think so. I have gained this impression from many conversations and from my reading, including reading what I myself have written.

My first suspicion that there is something dubious about our apparent affinity to philosophical history arose when I read historical studies which were perfectly straightforward and interesting in themselves, and yet were prefaced by quick and vague assurances of a familiar type, assurances to the effect that these studies were undertaken from a systematic point of view or with a systematic goal in mind. It seems to be a recently adopted distinguished tone among philosophers to say some such thing, a tone which grows louder as the interests of the profession become more historical. We must ask to what extent this common strategy of reconciling historical studies with present-day tasks is convincing. Sometimes, it seems to me, such reconciliation can be better effectuated by simply probing into history as contingent individual interests may suggest, and then letting history speak for itself.