Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Riots in Kosovo
- 2 Albanian Resentment Comes to a Boil
- 3 Armed Conflict Grows
- 4 Cease-Fire Breaks Down
- 5 Establishing the United Nations' First Colony
- 6 Living Under a Colonial Regime
- 7 Responding to the Wake-Up Call
- 8 The Politics of Purgatory
- 9 Enter Martti Ahtisaari
- 10 The Stage for Final Status
- 11 “Practical” Negotiations
- 12 Negotiations over Status Itself
- 13 The Ahtisaari Plan
- 14 The Plan Runs into Trouble
- 15 The Troika Takes Over
- 16 Independence Day
- 17 Kosovo's Future
- 18 Implications for the International Order
- Glossary of Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
12 - Negotiations over Status Itself
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Riots in Kosovo
- 2 Albanian Resentment Comes to a Boil
- 3 Armed Conflict Grows
- 4 Cease-Fire Breaks Down
- 5 Establishing the United Nations' First Colony
- 6 Living Under a Colonial Regime
- 7 Responding to the Wake-Up Call
- 8 The Politics of Purgatory
- 9 Enter Martti Ahtisaari
- 10 The Stage for Final Status
- 11 “Practical” Negotiations
- 12 Negotiations over Status Itself
- 13 The Ahtisaari Plan
- 14 The Plan Runs into Trouble
- 15 The Troika Takes Over
- 16 Independence Day
- 17 Kosovo's Future
- 18 Implications for the International Order
- Glossary of Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
On July 24, 2006, even as practical negotiations were proceeding, the first round of official talks to determine final status for Kosovo took place in Vienna. For these discussions, the delegations were led by the respective presidents: Boris Tadić of Serbia and Fatmir Sejdiu of Kosovo, who had replaced Ibrahim Rugova. The main purpose for this rendezvous was to allow each side to present and argue its respective position. Pristina stated that independence was its “alpha and omega” in these negotiations, while Belgrade reiterated that full independence remained unacceptable, and instead offered “autonomy” for Kosovar Albanians.
Despite this fundamental difference, both parties said they were pleased with the meeting. Kosovo President Sejdiu expressed his satisfaction afterwards, saying, “We presented our view to the international community by simply and directly arguing why Kosovo should be independent.” The Belgrade delegation, for its part, was content with the fact that its arguments were based on European values, and that it had offered a full compromise in the form of the broadest autonomy within Serbia.
Ahtisaari largely left the management of intra-Kosovo political dynamics to others, but he and Rohan worked hard to nurture the capacity of the Kosovar Albanian delegation to participate effectively in final status negotiations, regularly confronting them with hard realities that necessitated compromise if they were to get anywhere close to their goal of independence.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Road to Independence for KosovoA Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan, pp. 157 - 162Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009