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1 - Games and Solutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 March 2010

Paul Weirich
Affiliation:
University of Missouri, Columbia
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Summary

Game theory and decision theory have a symbiotic relationship. Game theory motivates revisions in principles of rational choice. And decision theory motivates revisions in accounts of solutions to games. My project is to revise game theory in light of reflections on rational choice. I provide a new account of equilibrium in games – equilibrium among strategic reasonersmotivated by equilibrium's connection with solutions and rational choice.

To explain equilibria and solutions, let us examine a game of Hide and Seek with a time limit. The Seeker has to find the Hider before time expires; otherwise the Hider wins. The Hider can conceal herself on either the first or the second floor of a house. The second floor is smaller than the first so that the Seeker can search all of it before time expires, whereas he can search only half the first floor in the time available. The second floor has windows from which, looking down through skylights, parts of the first floor can be seen. As a result, half the first floor can be searched while searching the second floor. The players know about the windows but do not know which parts of the first floor are visible from the second floor.

Shuttling between floors would be time wasting for the Seeker. His only effective strategies are (1) searching the first floor and (2) searching the second floor. The Hider also has to choose between the first and second floors.

Type
Chapter
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Equilibrium and Rationality
Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules
, pp. 1 - 28
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

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  • Games and Solutions
  • Paul Weirich, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • Book: Equilibrium and Rationality
  • Online publication: 18 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663727.002
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  • Games and Solutions
  • Paul Weirich, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • Book: Equilibrium and Rationality
  • Online publication: 18 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663727.002
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Games and Solutions
  • Paul Weirich, University of Missouri, Columbia
  • Book: Equilibrium and Rationality
  • Online publication: 18 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663727.002
Available formats
×