Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 “Real constituents of the world”
- Chapter 2 What can logic and language tell us about reality?
- Chapter 3 The “existence” of universals and the notion of possibility
- Chapter 4 The causal significance of basic attributes
- Chapter 5 Hierarchies of universals
- Chapter 6 Causal relations
- Chapter 7 Arbitrary particulars and unified particulars
- Chapter 8 Further considerations concerning the causal relation
- Chapter 9 Arbitrary particulars and physical objects
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 1 - “Real constituents of the world”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 “Real constituents of the world”
- Chapter 2 What can logic and language tell us about reality?
- Chapter 3 The “existence” of universals and the notion of possibility
- Chapter 4 The causal significance of basic attributes
- Chapter 5 Hierarchies of universals
- Chapter 6 Causal relations
- Chapter 7 Arbitrary particulars and unified particulars
- Chapter 8 Further considerations concerning the causal relation
- Chapter 9 Arbitrary particulars and physical objects
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
A BASIS FOR PREDICATION
Although the notion of particular is in need of some refinement, it can perhaps be accepted that the basic idea of a particular is familiar and not controversial. Certainly anyone today who wished to deny that there are particulars would have a lot of explaining to do. It is different with universals. The immanent realists' notion of universal is a metaphysician's idea, which not everyone regards as intuitively acceptable. But if, with Russell and Moore, we regard universals as “real constituents of the world”, along with particulars, we shall have to give an account of the notion of universal. It will have to be an account that brings out the way in which a universal is a real thing, something ontologically significant.
Frege notes that fundamental notions such as “concept”, and we may add “universal”, cannot have proper definitions. With such fundamental notions, “there is nothing for it but to lead the reader or hearer, by means of hints, to understand the words as intended”. What can be said about fundamental notions Frege calls an ‘explanation’; alternatively, it could be called a ‘characterization’. Our first aim, then, is to discuss a number of ways of characterizing the notion of universal that bring out the way in which a universal is a real constituent of the world.
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- Information
- The Physical Basis of Predication , pp. 1 - 11Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1992