Restructuring the bureaucracy

Without the support of the bureaucracy, Gorbachev's perestroika (restructuring) program cannot be implemented. Western experts presume that distinct elements of the Soviet bureaucracy oppose perestroika. They fear that bureaucratic opponents will pay it lip service, while quietly sabotaging it. This chapter attempts to anticipate how the Soviet economic bureaucracy will respond to perestroika and to determine whether the widespread fears of bureaucratic sabotage are justified.

The Western literature often presents a black and white picture of Soviet bureaucratic thinking: Bureaucrats above the enterprise level are presumed to oppose reform because they fear loss of jobs, loss of power, and reduction of perquisites. In contrast, enlightened managers are presumed to favor reform that gives them increased freedom of action. They want to be free from the petty tutelage (opeka) of the ministries and intervention by the local party (podmen) to run their enterprises efficiently. This chapter shows that this categorization of the reluctant bureaucrat and enthusiastic manager obscures important undercurrents. An understanding of how the Soviet economic bureaucracy works – its rules of the game, its goals, and its methods – sheds light on the bureaucracy's probable reception of perestroika. The Soviet economic bureaucracy is diverse – much depends on personalities, assessment of responsibility and risk, and institutional affiliations – and consequently its reactions to perestroika will not be uniform. Nevertheless, how each person and bureaucratic organization deals with perestroika will determine, in the long run, its success or failure.