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4 - Institutions and participants in the model of monetary oral pledges markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Donald A. Walker
Affiliation:
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

For many years, the opinion has been expressed in the literature on Léon Walras's work that he did not pay attention to market institutions in his models of market behavior. It is shown that in fact he founded his model of a monetary oral pledges market on a detailed specification of the institutions and other structural features that condition the traders' behavior, including rules, conventions, kinds of firms represented, and kinds of commodities and trades. It is also shown that he explained how the phenomena and processes of organized markets arise from economic needs and are related to other economic processes. He drew on empirical information to construct his model, and illuminated that information with his theoretical perceptions.

Introduction

The current view

The current view of Walras's work is that he did not pay attention to market institutions – namely, to the complex of rules and procedures that regulate and influence the behavior of the participants. William Jaffé expressed that view by writing that “Léon Walras sought to systematize the economic forces that he regarded in specie aeternitatis, i.e. economic forces which he thought were independent of institutional constraints” (Jaffé 1971, p. 98 [279]). Jaffé agreed with Oskar Lange that “the general equilibrium model of the Lausanne type is devoid of any specification of the institutional framework, precisely because it consists in nothing more than a pure theory of exchange, production and capital formation, positing only a freely competitive market of the atomistic variety” (ibid., p. 100 [281]).

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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