In 1919 Germany and her allies were crushed in war. The armistice and peace that followed were held to be ruinous for her by many. One might have expected Germany's removal as a major power in the European balance. Perhaps the time has come to examine how factors that operated to remove from the scene Germany's Austro-Hungarian ally had the opposite effect of maintaining and even strengthening Germany's position.

Twenty-five years after the end of World War I, Germany was in control of most of the European continent. Perhaps that ought to raise the question of how greatly her position in Europe had in fact been weakened at the end of World War I, if that position had provided a base from which she had gone further than she had managed to reach at the height of her strength in the prior conflict. Today, any German who suggests a return to the borders of Versailles is labeled an ultranationalist, a neo-Nazi, and a threat to the peace of Europe, if not of the world. Is it not strange that inside Germany the approval of boundaries that would once have been considered treasonous weakness in defense of what were alleged to be her national interest, should now be considered an outrageous demand, dangerous to her domestic institutions as well as her foreign relations? Does not this paradox suggest that we need to ponder some new general perspectives about the peace settlement?

By advocating new perspectives, I do not mean the application of hindsight.