Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-5lx2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-28T05:55:25.727Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - When the Future Worked and the Trains Ran on Time: Lincoln Steffens

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2010

H. W. Brands
Affiliation:
Texas A & M University
Get access

Summary

Walter Lippmann wasn't the only one disillusioned by the outcome of the war. The compromises Britain and France forced on Wilson at Paris repelled most American liberals – and many foreign ones, including John Maynard Keynes, who stomped out of the negotiations and tore off his scathing Economic Consequences of the Peace. The conservative opposition in America to even Wilson's attenuated treaty, combined with the president's refusal to budge the extra couple of inches that might have made the pact acceptable to the Senate, delivered the coup de grace to liberal hopes for a noble and lasting peace.

Not since before the Spanish-American War had the exemplarists held the advantage in American thinking on foreign affairs; now, with vindicationism clearly a bust, they began to reclaim lost ground. The first signs of the exemplarist revival took the form of retrospective assaults on Wilson's conduct of the war. Harry Elmer Barnes rejected the comforting notion that Germany bore primary responsibility for the conflict. Calling the war “the greatest crime against humanity and decency” since man's descent from the apes, Barnes identified the principal culprits as the leaders of France and Russia, with the British being accessories. As for the United States, he denied the causal role of German submarine warfare – which he characterized as “legitimate retaliation against the British violations of international law” – in triggering American entry. According to Barnes, Wilson's avowed neutrality had been a sham for many months prior to his request for a war declaration.

Type
Chapter
Information
What America Owes the World
The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy
, pp. 79 - 108
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×