Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction: trade policy flexibility in the WTO – vice or virtue?
- PART I An introduction to incomplete contracting
- PART II Theorizing about the WTO as an incomplete contract
- PART III Flexibility and enforcement in the WTO: towards an agenda for reform
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction: trade policy flexibility in the WTO – vice or virtue?
- PART I An introduction to incomplete contracting
- PART II Theorizing about the WTO as an incomplete contract
- PART III Flexibility and enforcement in the WTO: towards an agenda for reform
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the WTOA Law and Economics Analysis, pp. 324 - 346Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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