Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-cnmwb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-18T18:28:47.548Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The concept of non-international armed conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

from PART II - The anatomy of non-international armed conflict in international humanitarian law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

Anthony Cullen
Affiliation:
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge
Get access

Summary

As illustrated in the previous chapter, the concept of non-international armed conflict evolved in the final decade of the twentieth century to cover situations which had hitherto not been included within its scope. The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was pivotal in this regard, setting new parameters for non-international armed conflict in international humanitarian law. While the concept of non-international armed conflict contained in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is partly derived from that propounded in the case law of these tribunals, its threshold of applicability is however less clear. This chapter looks at possible lines of interpretation applicable to non-international armed conflict in the Statute and in doing so sets out an argument for an understanding of the threshold contained in Article 8(2)(f) as one equivalent to that of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

In adopting this approach, an argument will be advanced for the interpretation of the threshold contained in Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute as one applicable to all situations of non-international armed conflict within the Court's jurisdiction. The scope of applicability defined by this provision is held to be distinctly broader than that of Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II. It is also contended that there exist reasons, despite a difference in wording, to view the threshold contained in this provision as equivalent to that propounded in the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×