The theory of the state that Fichte sets out in his 1796/97 Foundations of Natural Right has much in common with earlier theories of the state belonging to the modern natural law tradition, such as the one developed by John Locke, insofar as the state's function is held to be the protection of property. As we shall see, Fichte, like Locke, operates with what, in the light of current linguistic usage, must be regarded as an extended meaning of the term ‘property’, so that there also appears to be some common ground concerning the precise nature of that which the state protects. I show, however, that such similarities should not be allowed to conceal the originality of Fichte's theory of property, in which a broad conception of property goes together with recognition of the fact that property rights may restrict human freedom, as well as being a means of realizing the latter, leading Fichte to place definite limitations on the ownership of property.

This brings me to a particular reason for regarding Fichte's theory of property as being highly significant, not only with respect to the history of political thought but also with respect to some present day concerns. The reason in question is that Fichte's theory of property provides an example of what an attempt to reconcile a liberal conception of the right to property with the equal right of individuals to use and develop their capacities by broadening the concept of property might look like.