Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-rvbq7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-09T20:19:29.515Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

14 - The Great Recession's impact on global corporate governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2011

William Sun
Affiliation:
Leeds Metropolitan University
Jim Stewart
Affiliation:
Leeds Metropolitan University
David Pollard
Affiliation:
Leeds Metropolitan University
Get access

Summary

‘Recessions reveal what the auditors missed.’

John Kenneth Galbraith

The Great Recession of 2008–9 is not a story of wholesale corporate governance failure. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that corporate governance for listed firms in most developed country markets has continued on a slope of gradual improvement of minority shareholder protections over the past decade, maintaining the momentum that it sustained during the 1990s.

It is true that the meltdown of a handful of large financial firms was the proximate trigger for the Great Recession, and that this meltdown, in turn, was the result of (among other sins) poor risk management supervision by the boards and perverse compensation structures for the managers of these firms. These cataclysmic failures of governance were an anomaly, however, and one limited to a small number of firms within the financial sector. In fact, indices of corporate governance for listed firms improved across the board during the 1990s, and this improvement continued right through the deep trough of the recession in 2008–9, although this pattern showed some divergence between developed and emerging markets.

Type
Chapter
Information
Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis
International Perspectives
, pp. 312 - 347
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aggarwal, R.Erel, I.Ferreira, M.Matos, P. 2009 http://fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/9860/20098.pdf
Ammann, A.Oesch, D.Schmid, M. 2009 www.phitrust.com/data/file/Documents_site_Internet/Corporate_Governance_and_Firm_Value_International_Evidence_Ammann_Oesch_and_Schmid_3_25_09.pdf
Bebchuk, L.Hamdani, A. 2009 ‘The elusive quest for global governance standards’University of Pennsylvania Law Review 157 1263Google Scholar
Becht, M.Bolton, P.Roell, A. 2007 ‘Corporate law and governance’Polinsky, M.Shavell, S.Handbook of Law and EconomicsAmsterdamElsevierGoogle Scholar
Bennett, R. 2009 ‘The US: the government as shareholder’International Corporate Governance Network 2009 Yearbook.Google Scholar
Blommestein, H.Gok, A. 2009 ‘The surge in borrowing needs of OECD governments: revised estimates for 2009 and 2010 outlook’, Financial Market Trend 97 177Google Scholar
Doidge, C.Karolyi, G.Stulz, R. 2007 ‘Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?’Journal of Financial Economics 86 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Euro Intelligence 2007 www.eurointelligence.com
European Commission 2009 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ market/investmentdoes/alternative_investments/fund_managers_proposal_ en.pdf
Federation of European Securities Exchanges 2008 Share Ownership Structure in EuropeBrusselsFederation of European Securities ExchangesGoogle Scholar
Gourevitch, P.Shinn, J. 2005 Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate GovernancePrinceton University PressGoogle Scholar
GovernanceMetrics Internationalwww.gmiratings.com/Products.aspx#basic
Holderness, C. 2008 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104678
Kollewe, J.Reece, D. 2005
La Porta, R.Lopez-de-Silances, F.Shleifer, A.Vishny, R. 2002 ‘Investor protection and corporate valuation’Journal of Finance 57 1147CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lifsher, M. 2009 ‘CalPERS to seek improved corporate governance, stricter Wall Street rules: the huge state pension fund also plans a thorough review of its investments in May’Sacramento Bee 9Google Scholar
Martynova, M.Renneboog, L. 2010
Milne, R. 2010
Ostry, J. D.Ghosh, A. R.Habermeier, K. F.Chamon, M. Q.Mahvash, S.Reinhardt, D. B. S. 2010
Perotti, E.Schwienbacher, A. 2007
RiskMetrics Group 2010 www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/GRId_Tech_Doc.pdf
Spamann, H. 2010 ‘The “antidirector rights index” revisited’Review of Financial Studies 23 467CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stulz, R. 2005 ‘The limits of financial globalization’The Journal of Finance 60 1595CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gotshal, Weil 2009 www.weil.com/files/upload/Briefing_SEC_CG_December_9.pdf

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×