Greece and the threat of a German attack

Although the Italian attack on Greece and sustained Greek resistance had led to a modification of British policy to Greece, none the less the sudden preoccupation with Greece was, by December, superseded by Wavell's desert offensive. With the success of that offensive by January, and the prospect of German intervention in Greece (possibly as part of a Hitlerian Drang nach Osten), attention returned to Greece. Although the Greeks had managed to sustain resistance to Italy, they could not stand up to the Germans. Should Britain try to prevent such a collapse by aid or, indeed, military intervention? Britain was bound to Greece by the declaration of 1939: that in the event of Greek (or Romanian) independence being threatened by action which the government(s) thought it vital to resist ‘His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Greek or Roumanian Government … all the support in their power.’ Moreover, failure to help, or to prolong Greek resistance, would have repercussions on the other Balkan countries and Turkey. If it were decided to strengthen Greece, to what extent should full-scale military intervention be planned? Wavell's armies would soon be in a position to halt their triumphant campaign and stand by ready for diversion to the Balkans.