Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- PART I AN INCREASED INCUMBENCY EFFECT: RECONSIDERING EVIDENCE
- PART II REALIGNMENT AND THE FORTUNES OF (SOME) INCUMBENTS
- 6 An Alternative Framework: The Role of Realignment
- 7 A Partisan View of Incumbent Percentages
- 8 The Role of Realignment
- 9 Conclusions and Implications
- PART III APPENDICES: MORE DETAILED ANALYSES OF INCUMBENCY EFFECT INDICATORS
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - An Alternative Framework: The Role of Realignment
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- PART I AN INCREASED INCUMBENCY EFFECT: RECONSIDERING EVIDENCE
- PART II REALIGNMENT AND THE FORTUNES OF (SOME) INCUMBENTS
- 6 An Alternative Framework: The Role of Realignment
- 7 A Partisan View of Incumbent Percentages
- 8 The Role of Realignment
- 9 Conclusions and Implications
- PART III APPENDICES: MORE DETAILED ANALYSES OF INCUMBENCY EFFECT INDICATORS
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
If the evidence of an increased incumbency effect is not convincing, does that mean that nothing happened regarding the electoral fortunes of incumbents? That is not the argument of this analysis. Indeed, there have been two changes involving incumbents, and both are important for understanding the electoral trends of recent decades. The first issue involves which incumbents have improved their situation. Over the last century, there has been a remarkable, long-term political realignment. Democrats dominated House elections from 1932 through 1992. That prompted a focused effort by Republicans to expand their electoral base, eventuating in their takeover of the House in 1995. As this realignment unfolded, it resulted in the improvement of the fortunes of Republican incumbents, but not in the improvement of the fortunes of Democratic incumbents. As Republican fortunes improved, their vote percentages and electoral safety increased, while those of Democrats did not. The change in incumbent fortunes has been partisan, benefiting one party and not the other. The focus on all incumbents missed that differential effect and portrayed change as general, as almost apolitical or nonpartisan. Instead, change was partisan, benefiting one party and not the other.
The second change involved all incumbents and was also a product of realignment. The process of change resulted in many districts changing their voting inclinations. That change created the appearance of incumbents becoming safer, even though they were not.
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- Reassessing the Incumbency Effect , pp. 67 - 87Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008