The numerous commentators on the Sedition Act of 1798 have typically been so appalled at its role in American history that they have largely neglected to examine its enactment and enforcement in the light of the jurisprudence of which it was an integral part. How was it possible for the generation of the Framers who had so wisely launched this country with the Revolution, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights to have adopted this repressive statute? The Act went so far as to criminalize “any false, scandalous, and malicious writing … against the [federal] government … or either house of the Congress or the President, with intent to defame … or to bring … either of them, into contempt or disrepute.” It was then employed in a determined effort to shut down the opposition Republican press by prosecuting and jailing editors of numerous leading Republican newspapers on the eve of the 1800 presidential election. Truly, it was one of the country's most unattractive political episodes.

This volume seeks to review this deservedly much condemned episode in American legal history in the light of the accepted jurisprudential and constitutional standards of the times. As we will see, it was not a departure from the legal standards of the age. Criminal libel was only one element of the repressive jurisprudence of the times. This is a critical dimension that the discussions of the Sedition Act have failed to take adequately into account.