If, then, as this book asserts, the Islamic world and the West are far from being radically distinct with respect to political modernity and the emergence of democracy, there is one dimension that has consistently been regarded as insurmountably different, namely, attitudes towards political violence. Pope Benedict XVI's controversial 2006 speech at the University of Regensburg exemplified the still widespread idea that the Islamic Middle East is the violent opposite pole to a West that has embraced peace as a result of Enlightenment, democracy and the painful experience of war. The Pope set out his view that Christianity has long since reconciled itself to the rationality of non-violence, while Islam, at least according to the implicit message of the speech, still subscribes to the idea that faith can be spread by violent means.

Pope Benedict is by no means alone. Influential intellectuals, authors and academics such as Samuel Huntington, Benjamin Barber, Bernard Lewis and Daniel Pipes have advocated variations on the same thesis over the last few decades, namely, that Islam is more violent and dangerous than other religions. The points of reference here vary widely. Huntington's main emphasis is on critical internal factors such as demographic pressures and the role of Islam in the formation of political identity (‘Islam has bloody borders’) (Huntington 1993, 1996). Barber on the other hand sees the readiness to use violence as caused by the shock effect of Western cultural globalization in the Islamic world (Barber 1993).