In the preceding part, it has been demonstrated what original assumptions the conceptions of international personality are based on and how they were manifested as well as substantiated in legal practice. It is now possible, in line with the basic purpose of this book, to determine in Part III which assumptions are still to be considered legally sound today and which ones have been discarded in international law over time. It is argued that while the assumptions of the individualistic and formal conceptions are supported in international law today, those of the states-only, recognition and actor conceptions generally are not. It follows that personality in international law has to be allocated and understood according to a legal framework primarily informed by the individualistic and formal conceptions. In order to substantiate this contention, this Part starts with a short recapitulation of the main points enunciated in Part II and evaluates the original assumptions and substantiations articulated therein in light of the present international legal system (1). Subsequently, a legal frame of reference combining the formal and individualistic conception is outlined and briefly illustrated by applying it to the four legal issues enumerated at the outset of this book (2).