Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figure
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Party's Promotion of the Private Sector
- 3 Co-opting the Capitalists
- 4 Bridges and Branches: The CCP's Institutional Links to the Private Sector
- 5 Views on the Economic, Political, and Social Environments
- 6 Private Entrepreneurs in Public Service: Participation in China's Formal Political Institutions
- 7 The Ripple Effects of Privatization: Corruption, Inequality, and Charity
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix: Survey Design
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Bridges and Branches: The CCP's Institutional Links to the Private Sector
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figure
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Party's Promotion of the Private Sector
- 3 Co-opting the Capitalists
- 4 Bridges and Branches: The CCP's Institutional Links to the Private Sector
- 5 Views on the Economic, Political, and Social Environments
- 6 Private Entrepreneurs in Public Service: Participation in China's Formal Political Institutions
- 7 The Ripple Effects of Privatization: Corruption, Inequality, and Charity
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix: Survey Design
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As the party gradually allowed the scope of the private sector to grow, it also created institutional means to manage and monitor private firms. It relied primarily on its traditional party-building practices: united front groups to organize entrepreneurs in different types of private firms and party branches within individual enterprises. These practices have had limited success. Although most private entrepreneurs belong to one or more of the official business associations, they have less confidence in their ability to serve members' interests than in the past, and party officials have less confidence in the ability of business associations to provide party leadership. Similarly, the CCP has been able to establish branches in a larger percentage of firms, especially large-scale enterprises, but they do a better job of supporting business operations than leading political work.
Local party-building efforts reveal a strong element of paternalism, one of the defining characteristics of crony communism. Local officials believe that entrepreneurs lack the business acumen and management skills to be successful, so it is the responsibility of the party to improve the performance of private firms. As the CCP's policy toward the private sector moved from “guide, supervise, and control” to “support, encourage, and guide,” party-building efforts likewise shifted their focus from the party's political and ideological goals to the enterprises' business and management needs. Party-building efforts have accordingly changed from political study and recruitment of new members to also include training on basic business practices and seeking out new business opportunities.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Wealth into PowerThe Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector, pp. 101 - 135Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008