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6 - The European Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 April 2011

Randall W. Stone
Affiliation:
University of Rochester, New York
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Summary

The European Union (EU), like the IMF and the WTO, combines elements of formal and informal governance, but the wider distribution of power in Europe and the high and rapidly increasing returns to European cooperation have shaped a different balance between formal and informal governance. The United States casts a long shadow over the EU, having deliberately encouraged many of its early steps towards integration, and having inadvertently incentivized many of the more recent developments, but the leading economic power's absence from EU membership is even more significant than its external influence. The model of informal governance focuses attention on the distribution of structural power, which in Europe is relatively flat: there are several countries that can compete for the role of leading power, and the power differentials among European countries are smaller than between European countries and the United States. In the absence of a single, overwhelmingly dominant state, several leading states are able to play the game of informal influence in Europe, which implies either low levels of cooperation or high levels of legalization. The history of European integration has seen both patterns, and legalization has been the only available solution to the dilemmas of sovereignty. Indeed, the contemporary EU is the most striking example of legislative and judicial delegation to an international organization.

Type
Chapter
Information
Controlling Institutions
International Organizations and the Global Economy
, pp. 104 - 130
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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  • The European Union
  • Randall W. Stone, University of Rochester, New York
  • Book: Controlling Institutions
  • Online publication: 11 April 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793943.007
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  • The European Union
  • Randall W. Stone, University of Rochester, New York
  • Book: Controlling Institutions
  • Online publication: 11 April 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793943.007
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • The European Union
  • Randall W. Stone, University of Rochester, New York
  • Book: Controlling Institutions
  • Online publication: 11 April 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793943.007
Available formats
×