Understanding the chasm between accommodationists and confrontationalists is critical not only because it affects U.S. domestic politics but also because it provides the intellectual basis for American policy toward political Islam. Various U.S. administrations' perceptions of Islamists parallel those of the two opposing schools of thought. According to a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, both confrontationalist and accommodationist views are well entrenched within the U.S. foreign-policy establishment: “[T]he hard-liners would like to draw a line in the sand against militant Islamists, whereas liberals prefer dialogue, diplomacy, and reconciliation with Islamists.”

Carter's Collision with Political Islam: The Iranian Revolution

Although presidents Carter and Reagan witnessed the rise to power of Islamic movements in the Middle East, as a result facing difficult policy choices in that sphere, neither one articulated publicly any systematic set of ideas on political Islam. Both were preoccupied with the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. Communism, not Islamic activism, was seen as the main enemy. Despite the intensification of Islamist sentiments in several Muslim societies, Carter and Reagan administration officials did not shift their strategic focus away from the Soviet Union, largely perceiving the new Islamists as a mere nuisance rather than a serious threat. Furthermore, the Carter and Reagan administrations showed a willingness to play down their differences with Islamists and align the United States with them in the common fight against the Soviets.