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1 - Abortion and Moral Argument

from PART I - MORAL REASONING, LAW, AND POLITICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Francis J. Beckwith
Affiliation:
Baylor University, Texas
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Summary

I have participated in a number of public discussions on the question of abortion. Inevitably, either my opponent or a member of the audience will make the assertion, “Don't like abortion, don't have one,” followed by rousing applause by like-minded audience members. This assertion, though common, reveals not only a deep misunderstanding about the nature of the abortion debate but also a confusion about what it means to say that something is morally wrong.

The culprit, I believe, is moral relativism: the view that when it comes to questions of morality, there is no absolute or objective right and wrong; moral rules are merely personal preferences and/or the result of one's cultural, sexual, or ethnic orientation. So choosing an abortion, like choosing an automobile, a vacation spot, or dessert, is merely a matter of preference. Some people like Häagen DazsTM, others abortion. To each his own. Just like it is wrong for one to judge another's taste in ice cream – “You will burn in hell for eating almond roca” – it is wrong for one to judge another's reproductive choices and to ask for the law to reflect that judgment.

Many people see relativism as necessary for promoting tolerance, nonjudgmentalism, and inclusiveness, for they think if one believes one's moral position is correct and others' incorrect, one is close-minded and intolerant.

Type
Chapter
Information
Defending Life
A Moral and Legal Case against Abortion Choice
, pp. 3 - 17
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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