Tensions within the Idea of Autonomy

Those of us who are sympathetic to Kantian ethics usually are so because we regard it as an ethics of autonomy, based on respect for the human capacity to govern our own lives according to rational principles. Kantian ethical theory is grounded on the idea that the moral law is binding on me only because it is regarded as proceeding from my own will. The idea of autonomy identifies the authority of the law with the objective value constituting the content of the law. It bases the law on our esteem for the dignity of rational nature, which makes every rational being the moral legislator.

Yet between these last two sentences (which might even be taken as saying the same thing) there in fact emerges a serious tension in the Kantian idea of autonomy. This tension threatens to pull the doctrine of autonomy apart, depending upon whether we emphasize the ‘autos’ or the ‘nomos’ – the rational being's will as author or legislator of the moral law, or the law itself as objectively binding on that same will.