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3 - PUBLIC GOODS

Arye L. Hillman
Arye L. Hillman
Affiliation:
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
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Summary

Chapter 1 showed how competitive markets achieve efficiency for private goods – or goods that benefit one person. We also noted that for public goods, which can benefit many people simultaneously, we do not expect markets to result in efficient supply of public goods because people can benefit when others pay. In chapter 1, we also encountered an example of a public good in the rule of law. In this chapter, we investigate public goods in detail.

Because many people benefit simultaneously, public goods could well be called collective goods. The collective benefit suggests a need for collective decisions. Public goods thereby provide a foundation for a “theory of the state,” through the need for institutions of government that allow collective decisions to be made.

The need for government is, however, subject to the characteristics of institutions: we saw in chapter 2 that political and bureaucratic principal–agent problems impose limitations on delegating responsibilities to governments.

In this chapter, we shall for the most part set aside the limitations of political and bureaucratic principal–agent problems. We shall ask normative questions about the desirable role of government as if political decision makers and bureaucrats could always be assured to be the faithful agents of taxpayers and voters. The questions that we ask are, therefore, about what political and bureaucratic decision makers who faithfully seek the public interest should do – or can do – to ensure availability of public goods.

Type
Chapter
Information
Public Finance and Public Policy
Responsibilities and Limitations of Government
 , pp. 135 - 242
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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References

Buchanan, J. M., 1968. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods. Rand-McNalley, Chicago.Google Scholar
Coase, R. H., 1974. The lighthouse in economics. Journal of Law and Economics 17:357–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindahl, E., 1919. Positive Lösung: Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung. Lund. Reprinted as: Just taxation – A positive solution. In Musgrave, R. A. and Peacock, A. T. (Eds.), 1967. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, St. Martin's Press, New York, pp. 168–76.Google Scholar
Samuelson, P. A., 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 36:387–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, P. A., 1955. Diagrammatic exposition of a pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 37:350–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wicksell, K., 1896. A New Principle of Just Taxation. Finanztheoretische Untersuchnung, Jena. Reprinted in Musgrave, R. A. and Peacock, A. T. (Eds.), 1967. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, St. Martin's Press, New York, pp. 72–118.Google Scholar
On results of experiments on the public-good game and a review of literature on evolution of social conventions of cooperation, see:
Ostrom, E., 2000. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14:137–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On expressive behavior that confirms self-identity, which we suggested can influence decisions to cooperate in public-good games, see:
Akerlof, G. A., and Kranton, R. E., 2000. Economics and identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115:715–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On sequential voluntary financing of public goods, see:
Fershtman, C., and Nitzan, S., 1991. Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods. European Economic Review 35:1057–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gradstein, M., 1994. Efficient provision of a discrete public good. International Economic Review 35:877–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Max, L. M., and Matthews, S. A., 2000. Dynamic voluntary provision to a public project. Review of Economic Studies 67:327–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cornes, R., 1993. Dyke maintenance and other stories: Some neglected types of public goods. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:259–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrison, G., and Hirshleifer, J., 1989. An experimental evaluation of weakest-link/best-shot public goods. Journal of Political Economy 97:201–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausken, K., 2006. Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed. European Journal of Political Economy 22:251–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirshleifer, J., 1983. From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods. Public Choice 41:371–86 (and 1985, 46:221–3).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Xu, X., 2001. Group size and the private supply of a best-shot public good. European Journal of Political Economy 17:897–904.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schnytzer, A., 1994. An economic model of regime change: Freedom as a public good. Public Choice 79:325–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1974. The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. University Publications, Blacksburg.Google Scholar
Sandler, T., and Hartley, K., 1995. The Economics of Defense. Cambridge University Press, New York.Google Scholar
Arad, R., and Hillman, A. L., 1979. Embargo threat, learning, and departure from comparative advantage. Journal of International Economics 9:265–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayer, W., 1977. The national defense tariff argument reconsidered. Journal of International Economics 7:363–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garfinkel, M. R., 1994. Domestic politics and international conflict. American Economic Review 84:1294–309.Google Scholar
Gupta, S. L., Mello, L., and Sharan, R., 2001. Corruption and military spending. European Journal of Political Economy 17:749–77. Reprinted in Abed, G. T. and Gupta, S. (Eds.), 2002. Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, pp. 300–32.Google Scholar
Bernholz, P., 1993. Necessary conditions for totalitarianism, supreme values, power, and personal interest. In G. Radnitzsky and H. Boullion (Eds.), Government: Servant or Master. Rodopi, Amsterdam and Atlanta, pp. 267–312.
Bernholz, P., 2004. Supreme values as the basis for terror. European Journal of Political Economy 20:291–516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enders, W., and Sandler, T., 2006. The Political Economy of Terrorism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.Google Scholar
Frey, B. S., 2004. Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or Carrot?Edward Elgar, Cheltenham U.K.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Inbar, E., 2006. Review of B. S. Frey, Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or Carrot? European Journal of Political Economy 22:343–4.Google Scholar
Murawiec, L., 2008. Deterring those who are already dead? In Frisch, H. and Inbar, E. (Eds.), Radical Islam and International Security, Routledge, Abington, U.K., and New York, pp. 180–7.Google Scholar
Franck, R., Hillman, A. L., and Krausz, M., 2005. Public safety and the moral dilemma in the defense against terror. Defense and Peace Economics 16:347–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yon, P., 2008. Moment of Truth in Iraq. Richard Vigilante Books, Minneapolis, MN.Google Scholar
Brück, T., and Wickström, B.-A. (Eds.), 2004. Economic consequences of terror. European Journal of Political Economy. Special issue, June.
Krueger, A., and Maleckova, J., 2003. Education, poverty, and terrorism. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17:119–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mueller, D. C., 2004. Rights and citizenship in a world of global terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy 20:335–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clarke, E. H., 1980. Demand Revelation and the Provision of Public Goods. Ballinger, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Tideman, N., and Tullock, G., 1976. A new and superior process for making social choices. Journal of Political Economy 84:1145–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Jenkner, E., 2004. User payments for basic education in low-income countries. In Gupta, S., Clements, B., and Inchauste, G. (Eds.), Helping Countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, pp. 233–64. Also: How to pay for basic education: Poor children in poor countries. Economic Issues 33, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 2004.Google Scholar
Jimenez, E., 1987. Pricing Policy in the Social Sectors: Cost Recovery for Education and Health in Developing Countries. Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, Baltimore MD.Google Scholar
Tiebout, C. M., 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64:416–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1965. An economic theory of clubs. Economica 32:1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Swan, P. L., 1983. Participation rules for Pareto-optimal clubs. Journal of Public Economics 20:55–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Littlechild, S. C., and Owen, G., 1973. A simple expression for the Shapely value in a special case. Management Science 20:370–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nash, J. F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18:155–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapely, L. S., 1953. A value for n-person games. In Kuhn, H. W. and Tucker, A. W. (Eds.), Contributions to Game Theory II (Annals of Mathematical Studies 28), Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, pp. 307–17.Google Scholar
Darvish-Lecker, T., and Eckstein, S., 1991. Optimizing foreign loan conditions for a public-sector project. Journal of Policy Modeling 13:529–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mishan, E. J., and Quah, E., 2007. Cost-Benefit Analysis. Routledge, London.Google Scholar
Price, C., 1993. Time, Discounting, and Value. Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar
Usher, D., 2001. Personal goods, efficiency, and the law. European Journal of Political Economy 17:673–703.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Viscusi, W. K., 1999. The government composition of the insurance costs of smoking. Journal of Law and Economics 42:575–609.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Viscusi, V. K., and Moore, M. J., 1991. Rates of time preference and valuations of the duration of life. Journal of Public Economics 38:297–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J., and McGuire, M., 1993. Identifying the free riders: A simple algorithm for determining who will contribute to a public good. Journal of Public Economics 51:447–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cornes, R., and Sandler, T., 1996. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. Cambridge University Press, New York.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., and Varian, H., 1986. On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics 29:25–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Warr, P., 1983. The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income. Economics Letters 13:207–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baik, K. B., 1993. Effort levels in contests: The public-good prize case. Economics Letters 41:363–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gradstein, M., 1993. Rent seeking and the provision of public goods. Economic Journal 103:1236–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riaz, K., Shogren, J. S., and Johnson, S. R., 1995. A general model of rent seeking for a public good. Public Choice 82:243–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ursprung, H. W., 1990. Public goods, rent dissipation, and candidate competition. Economics and Politics 2:115–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
The previously listed papers are reprinted in:
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., and Konrad, K. A. (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1: The Theory of Rent-Seeking. Springer, Berlin.
Konrad, K. A., 1994. The strategic advantage of being poor: Public and private provision of public goods. Economica 61:79–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayer, W., 2002. On the efficiency of by-product lobbying. Public Choice 112:275–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgan, J., 2000. Financing public goods by means of lotteries. Review of Economic Studies 67:761–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pecorino, P., 2001. Can by-product lobbying firms compete?Journal of Public Economics 82:377–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G. J., 1964. A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy 72:44–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G. J., 1974. Free riders and collective action: An appendix to theories of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5:359–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, P. A., 1955. Diagrammatic exposition of a pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 37:350–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1968. The Demand and Supply of Public Goods. Rand-McNalley, Chicago.Google Scholar
Coase, R. H., 1974. The lighthouse in economics. Journal of Law and Economics 17:357–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindahl, E., 1919. Positive Lösung: Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung. Lund. Reprinted as: Just taxation – A positive solution. In Musgrave, R. A. and Peacock, A. T. (Eds.), 1967. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, St. Martin's Press, New York, pp. 168–76.Google Scholar
Samuelson, P. A., 1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 36:387–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, P. A., 1955. Diagrammatic exposition of a pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 37:350–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wicksell, K., 1896. A New Principle of Just Taxation. Finanztheoretische Untersuchnung, Jena. Reprinted in Musgrave, R. A. and Peacock, A. T. (Eds.), 1967. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, St. Martin's Press, New York, pp. 72–118.Google Scholar
On results of experiments on the public-good game and a review of literature on evolution of social conventions of cooperation, see:
Ostrom, E., 2000. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14:137–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On expressive behavior that confirms self-identity, which we suggested can influence decisions to cooperate in public-good games, see:
Akerlof, G. A., and Kranton, R. E., 2000. Economics and identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115:715–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On sequential voluntary financing of public goods, see:
Fershtman, C., and Nitzan, S., 1991. Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods. European Economic Review 35:1057–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gradstein, M., 1994. Efficient provision of a discrete public good. International Economic Review 35:877–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Max, L. M., and Matthews, S. A., 2000. Dynamic voluntary provision to a public project. Review of Economic Studies 67:327–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cornes, R., 1993. Dyke maintenance and other stories: Some neglected types of public goods. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:259–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrison, G., and Hirshleifer, J., 1989. An experimental evaluation of weakest-link/best-shot public goods. Journal of Political Economy 97:201–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausken, K., 2006. Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed. European Journal of Political Economy 22:251–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirshleifer, J., 1983. From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods. Public Choice 41:371–86 (and 1985, 46:221–3).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Xu, X., 2001. Group size and the private supply of a best-shot public good. European Journal of Political Economy 17:897–904.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schnytzer, A., 1994. An economic model of regime change: Freedom as a public good. Public Choice 79:325–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., 1974. The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. University Publications, Blacksburg.Google Scholar
Sandler, T., and Hartley, K., 1995. The Economics of Defense. Cambridge University Press, New York.Google Scholar
Arad, R., and Hillman, A. L., 1979. Embargo threat, learning, and departure from comparative advantage. Journal of International Economics 9:265–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayer, W., 1977. The national defense tariff argument reconsidered. Journal of International Economics 7:363–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garfinkel, M. R., 1994. Domestic politics and international conflict. American Economic Review 84:1294–309.Google Scholar
Gupta, S. L., Mello, L., and Sharan, R., 2001. Corruption and military spending. European Journal of Political Economy 17:749–77. Reprinted in Abed, G. T. and Gupta, S. (Eds.), 2002. Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, pp. 300–32.Google Scholar
Bernholz, P., 1993. Necessary conditions for totalitarianism, supreme values, power, and personal interest. In G. Radnitzsky and H. Boullion (Eds.), Government: Servant or Master. Rodopi, Amsterdam and Atlanta, pp. 267–312.
Bernholz, P., 2004. Supreme values as the basis for terror. European Journal of Political Economy 20:291–516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enders, W., and Sandler, T., 2006. The Political Economy of Terrorism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.Google Scholar
Frey, B. S., 2004. Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or Carrot?Edward Elgar, Cheltenham U.K.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Inbar, E., 2006. Review of B. S. Frey, Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or Carrot? European Journal of Political Economy 22:343–4.Google Scholar
Murawiec, L., 2008. Deterring those who are already dead? In Frisch, H. and Inbar, E. (Eds.), Radical Islam and International Security, Routledge, Abington, U.K., and New York, pp. 180–7.Google Scholar
Franck, R., Hillman, A. L., and Krausz, M., 2005. Public safety and the moral dilemma in the defense against terror. Defense and Peace Economics 16:347–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yon, P., 2008. Moment of Truth in Iraq. Richard Vigilante Books, Minneapolis, MN.Google Scholar
Brück, T., and Wickström, B.-A. (Eds.), 2004. Economic consequences of terror. European Journal of Political Economy. Special issue, June.
Krueger, A., and Maleckova, J., 2003. Education, poverty, and terrorism. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17:119–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mueller, D. C., 2004. Rights and citizenship in a world of global terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy 20:335–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clarke, E. H., 1980. Demand Revelation and the Provision of Public Goods. Ballinger, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Tideman, N., and Tullock, G., 1976. A new and superior process for making social choices. Journal of Political Economy 84:1145–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Jenkner, E., 2004. User payments for basic education in low-income countries. In Gupta, S., Clements, B., and Inchauste, G. (Eds.), Helping Countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, pp. 233–64. Also: How to pay for basic education: Poor children in poor countries. Economic Issues 33, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 2004.Google Scholar
Jimenez, E., 1987. Pricing Policy in the Social Sectors: Cost Recovery for Education and Health in Developing Countries. Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, Baltimore MD.Google Scholar
Tiebout, C. M., 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64:416–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J. M., 1965. An economic theory of clubs. Economica 32:1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hillman, A. L., and Swan, P. L., 1983. Participation rules for Pareto-optimal clubs. Journal of Public Economics 20:55–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Littlechild, S. C., and Owen, G., 1973. A simple expression for the Shapely value in a special case. Management Science 20:370–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nash, J. F., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18:155–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapely, L. S., 1953. A value for n-person games. In Kuhn, H. W. and Tucker, A. W. (Eds.), Contributions to Game Theory II (Annals of Mathematical Studies 28), Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, pp. 307–17.Google Scholar
Darvish-Lecker, T., and Eckstein, S., 1991. Optimizing foreign loan conditions for a public-sector project. Journal of Policy Modeling 13:529–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mishan, E. J., and Quah, E., 2007. Cost-Benefit Analysis. Routledge, London.Google Scholar
Price, C., 1993. Time, Discounting, and Value. Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar
Usher, D., 2001. Personal goods, efficiency, and the law. European Journal of Political Economy 17:673–703.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Viscusi, W. K., 1999. The government composition of the insurance costs of smoking. Journal of Law and Economics 42:575–609.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Viscusi, V. K., and Moore, M. J., 1991. Rates of time preference and valuations of the duration of life. Journal of Public Economics 38:297–317.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J., and McGuire, M., 1993. Identifying the free riders: A simple algorithm for determining who will contribute to a public good. Journal of Public Economics 51:447–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cornes, R., and Sandler, T., 1996. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. Cambridge University Press, New York.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.Google Scholar
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., and Varian, H., 1986. On the private provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics 29:25–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Warr, P., 1983. The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income. Economics Letters 13:207–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baik, K. B., 1993. Effort levels in contests: The public-good prize case. Economics Letters 41:363–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gradstein, M., 1993. Rent seeking and the provision of public goods. Economic Journal 103:1236–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riaz, K., Shogren, J. S., and Johnson, S. R., 1995. A general model of rent seeking for a public good. Public Choice 82:243–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ursprung, H. W., 1990. Public goods, rent dissipation, and candidate competition. Economics and Politics 2:115–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
The previously listed papers are reprinted in:
Congleton, R. D., Hillman, A. L., and Konrad, K. A. (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1: The Theory of Rent-Seeking. Springer, Berlin.
Konrad, K. A., 1994. The strategic advantage of being poor: Public and private provision of public goods. Economica 61:79–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayer, W., 2002. On the efficiency of by-product lobbying. Public Choice 112:275–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgan, J., 2000. Financing public goods by means of lotteries. Review of Economic Studies 67:761–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pecorino, P., 2001. Can by-product lobbying firms compete?Journal of Public Economics 82:377–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G. J., 1964. A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy 72:44–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G. J., 1974. Free riders and collective action: An appendix to theories of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5:359–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Samuelson, P. A., 1955. Diagrammatic exposition of a pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 37:350–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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  • PUBLIC GOODS
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.004
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • PUBLIC GOODS
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.004
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • PUBLIC GOODS
  • Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
  • Book: Public Finance and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813788.004
Available formats
×