INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 1 we pointed out that there are two sorts of arguments for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility: Indirect and Direct. The Indirect Arguments first seek to show that causal determinism rules out alternative possibilities. Then they conclude that causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, insofar as moral responsibility requires the kind of control that involves alternative possibilities. We have contended that the indirect arguments fail, because moral responsibility (for actions, omissions, and consequences) does not require the sort of control that involves alternative possibilities.

Now it is time to turn to the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility. It is interesting that the sorts of considerations that led us to reject the Indirect Arguments will also lead us away from the Direct Arguments. That is, Frankfurt-style examples will here play a significant role, as they have in previous chapters.

THE DIRECT ARGUMENT FOR INCOMPATIBILISM

The Direct Argument uses a principle structurally similar to the principle employed in the modal version of the Indirect Challenge to moral responsibility: the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness.