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17 - The Limits of Reciprocity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

David Schmidtz
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
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Summary

Thesis: No single principle is more than an element of justice. Principles of reciprocity, though, are at the core of a just society.

RECIPROCITY AND BASIC STRUCTURE

Allen Buchanan says, “To the extent that justice as reciprocity is conceptually barred from even considering the justice or injustice of the choice of the fundamental framework for cooperation and hence the choice of criteria for membership in the class of contributors, it is a superficial view. Indeed, justice as reciprocity is incapable of even recognizing what may be the greatest injustice a person can suffer: morally arbitrary exclusion from the class of subjects of justice.”

First, a preliminary: What Buchanan calls superficial is not such a bad thing. A basic structure is not the only entity that has a job to do. It would be foolish to think our society is just only if its basic structure all by itself guarantees that we all get whatever we are due. Much of what we are due comes to us via each other, not via basic structure. Inevitably, citizens handle (and must be trusted to handle) much of the responsibility for making sure they and their neighbors are, within reason, treated fairly. Not every matter of justice is a matter of basic structure.

Preliminaries aside, though, I agree with Buchanan that it would be odd for a theory to have nothing to say about basic structures that form the background against which everyday reciprocal exchange takes place.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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