In his post-Tractatus years Wittgenstein represented himself as solving – or dispelling – philosophical problems by paying close attention to the use of those words that lead to philosophical puzzlement. We have seen that very often, at least, he did not do what he claimed to be doing. In this chapter I want to call attention to another instance in which, rather than paying attention to what we actually say, he simply invented something in order to reach conclusions that suited him, namely, his way of dealing with philosophical skepticism regarding ‘induction.’

Induction and Skepticism

Induction is itself one of the myths invented by empiricists. There could never be any such thing. A philosopher could think that scientists (and others) employ ‘the inductive method’ only if he also thinks that nothing causes anything (except in Hume's ersatz sense). The idea behind speaking of ‘the inductive method’ is this: we experiment in order to discover regularities in nature, and the point of seeking out regularities is that we have to deal with the future in various ways. The more instances we have found of a given regularity, the better equipped we are to predict and to act. But what does “better equipped” mean here? Empiricists (Humeans) have differed widely on this matter. Some have said that the more instances we have found of a regularity the more probable it is that the regularity will persist in the future.