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9 - The French experience and interest-group theory-building

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2012

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Summary

In this chapter we will return to the alternative models of interest-group politics defined in chapter 2 to see which ones are useful in understanding contemporary French politics. From this will come some general theoretical perspectives that may be useful in interpreting interest-group politics in other industrial democracies.

Alternative models of interest-group politics

As should be apparent by this point, none of the four models of interest-group politics presented in chapter 2 is sufficient to describe the reality of group/government relationships in France. Instead, there are some features from each model present in contemporary French interest-group politics. Before explaining the significance of this blending, it is important to first review the models to note how each corresponds and differs from the real world.

The applicability of the neo-corporatist model

Neo-corporatism has caught the fancy of many students of western democracies who see a gradual but inevitable trend toward neo-corporatist patterns of interest-group/government relationships. Most analysts have seen few signs of neo-corporatism in France and my own observations confirm this. A brief review of some of the principal interest-group structures, actions, and leadership attitudes will demonstrate the paucity of neo-corporatist traits.

There are certain features of French interest-group politics that suggest corporatist relationships. Perhaps the most important is the large number of official committees that bring interest-group representatives formally and by statute into the decision process. However, to give much importance to these bodies without examining their actual operation and significance in policy decisions is to give excessive weight to formal, legal definitions of these institutions rather than objective judgments on their actual operation and influence.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1988

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