The rationalistic conception of interests

Having established in the previous chapter that the most appropriate conception of interests is essentially prudential and self-regarding but not private, it is now necessary to look at the possibility of prudential errors in this range of wants. The relevant feature in the notion of interests that identifies such errors is rationality. Most theorists who have dealt with the concept of interests and who have not adopted an objective, impersonal conception of interests, such that the distinctiveness of the individual is not relevant to the articulation of his interests, have made rationality of one form or another a critical requirement. Errors in wants are irrationalities that must be removed from the wants before they appropriately represent interests. This requirement is the core of what can be referred to as the rationalistic conception of interests.

The introduction of the rationality requirement is different from the previous modification in the conception of interests, as reflected in the various sovereignty conceptions. Whereas the latter, that is, “consumer sovereignty,” “private sovereignty,” and “personal sovereignty,” as well as the market, core, and constitutive conceptions of each of these, have referred to certain ranges of types of wants, what rationality indicates is a certain quality in wants, regardless of what types of wants are involved. The issue here is one not of inclusion or exclusion, but of acceptance or correction.