When a political system serves unworthy values, how does this fact affect the duty to obey its laws? The latest debate on this subject, between theoreticians of law and state, dealt with a subgroup of such political systems, i.e. with unjust and undemocratic systems. Furthermore, it was conducted on a background of humanist and liberal value systems. However, the logic of the arguments presented in this debate applies to more than just political systems which are tainted by injustice. It also applies to systems which are tainted by other important types of moral faults. Moreover, this logic is suited not only to humanism and liberalism. It is also suited to other types of value systems.

I point this out at the beginning of my present discussion, as this chapter will, for the most part, revolve on this debate, and will thus generally be conducted in terms of justice and democracy. It is important to note, and I shall return to this point, that this debate, in abstraction, may be applied to any important moral value, not only to those of justice and democracy, and to any value system, not only those of humanism and liberalism.

In the debate I'm referring to, that between Simmons and Rawls, the latter is of the opinion that gross injustice on the part of the political system renders the duty to obey its laws void ab initio.