Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-m8s7h Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T13:28:16.980Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Eminent Domain and Regulatory Takings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Gregory S. Alexander
Affiliation:
Cornell University School of Law
Eduardo M. Peñalver
Affiliation:
Cornell University School of Law
Get access

Summary

One of the most controversial aspects of American property law, and the subject of this chapter, is the government’s authority to expropriate private property through eminent domain. Although the origins of collective expropriations of land for the public good are quite old, in the United States, the eminent domain power originates from the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides, in relevant part, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” This is the so-called takings clause of the federal constitution. It permits government at all levels, federal, state, and local, to expropriate (or condemn) land and other forms of property on two conditions – the expropriation must be for public use and the government must pay just compensation. Although the meaning of just compensation is now well-settled, the precise meanings of take and public use remain the subject of much debate.

The takings clause is also implicated when the government, rather than condemning land, regulates the use of land under police power but does so to an extent that seems tantamount to a confiscation. These so-called regulatory takings have been at the center of some of the most intractable controversies involving the takings clause. As we will see, rival views on these controversies reflect competing underlying theories of the nature of and reasons for private property.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1922
2011

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×