Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vpsfw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T03:30:47.598Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Alternative employment and payment systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2012

Samuel Bowles
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Herbert Gintis
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Bo Gustafsson
Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
Get access

Summary

Wage employment: fixed rate, subjection, and job insecurity

The standard employment contract has three main features:

  1. (i) A fixed rate (whether in money or in indexed contracts, targeted in real terms) per unit of time at a monitored effort supply above a minimum level.

  2. (ii) Subjection to the employer's authority in the workplace.

  3. (iii) Job insecurity (i.e., exposure to unemployment risk), depending among other things on the enterprise's success or failure.

Alternative employment and payment systems involve modifications of these three features, introducing:

  1. (i) Profit-sharing or payments related to other indicators of enterprise performance (e.g., group productivity in physical terms, sales, value added); this includes collective participation in enterprise capital (Employee Stock Ownership Schemes or Trusts, ESOPs and ESOTs). Personal share ownership (PEPs in the UK) and wage-earners' funds at national or regional level (such as the Meidner Plan or its blander implementation in Sweden) do not alter the fixed nature of earnings with respect to the performance of the employee's enterprise.

  2. (ii) Workers' participation in enterprise decision-making, which we could call power-sharing (as in the German-style Mitbestimmung).

  3. (iii) Job security.

Permutations of the employment contract

There are only eight possible combinations and permutations demonstrating the presence or absence of profit-sharing, power-sharing and job security; all are actually observed or have been proposed, and their main types are illustrated in Table 3.1. Of course each combination contains any number of alternative degrees of intensity of any of the three features actually present.

Type
Chapter
Information
Markets and Democracy
Participation, Accountability and Efficiency
, pp. 40 - 48
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×