The task set at the beginning of this study was to understand the precise way in which Deleuze asserts the ontological priority of events over substances in his 1969 publication, The Logic of Sense. This assertion, it has been seen, takes a very particular and complex form. Indeed, it has been shown throughout the preceding chapters how Deleuze constructs a concept of the ontologically primitive event – the event which ontologically depends on no underlying substance, but on which all substantial things ontologically depend – with reference to the way in which various figures and intellectual movements in the history of thought collectively pose and resolve what can be called the ‘problem’ of the event. In other words, Deleuze extracts from the work of the above-examined thinkers a number of event-related problems and a hybrid family of event-related concepts which, with certain important qualifications, can be said to resolve these problems. Let us therefore review the various stages of the way in which Deleuze constructs his concept of the event, spelling out how the event is to be understood if everything is ultimately to be thought of as ontologically dependent on events. We shall then be in a position to make some evaluative comments with regard to Deleuze's project as a whole in The Logic of Sense.

First of all, Deleuze analyzes the way in which the ‘verbs of becoming’ in denoting propositions express ‘ideal events’ which are ontologically prior to determined states of affairs.