To whom am I obligated? And in what sense am I obligated – to what end, with what severity, and with how much scope? Levinas's ethics induces plenty of vertigo in the face-to-face. The character of my relation to the Other forecloses the possibility of fully adequate response; the infinity of obligation overwhelms the finitude of my person and my place in the world. And yet that is my responsibility, which incarnates obligation in the same manner in which the Cartesian sense of the Infinite is thought: what comes to mind overflows consciousness as a matter of principle, not will or commitment. As well, I am responsible without the possibility of evasion, not just for the Other, but for all Others. My responsibility exceeds presence in multiple ways, from the infinity of the singular Other to the signification of humanity as such in the ethical encounter. Infinity, multiple ways. How we get to that severe and seemingly preposterous claim is a long story, some of which is recounted in the preceding chapters, but even after that story is told, there is more obligation for which we must account.