It could be argued that suffering is the sine qua non of all ethical subjects and of ethical subjectivity itself; the problem of suffering is the motivation of the ethical Subject and the subject matter to which all ethical concern must ultimately be referred. It is the provocation to which the Subject's becoming ethical is the response. Yet suffering is repugnant to the life of the Subject itself; suffering is precisely that from which life distances itself in order to live and to flourish. The relationship to suffering is thus profoundly ambiguous: in distancing itself from suffering, life remains fascinated by it; it provides the measure by which well-being comes to know itself as such and in terms of the absence of suffering and its distance from it. A relationship with suffering is thereby maintained across that distance opened up between the Subject and suffering, whilst suffering serves as a constant reminder to it of the fate that can befall it. That suffering persists and ‘demands’ alleviation across the distance between the suffering and the non-suffering Subject, suggests both a connection and a disjunction between the very existence of the Subject and the demand for alleviation from/of suffering to which it has already responded in its aversion to suffering.