Iskat (overthrowing) or islah (reforming)? That was the question faced by Middle Eastern protesters during the Arab Spring of 2011. Moroccans and Jordanians opted for transitioning towards reform by calling for a mere change of government (hukuma), whereas Tunisians and Egyptians resorted towards transitioning to revolution by demanding the changing of the entire regime (nizam). Why was this so? Were the transitions realised, and to what extent had they been realised by the summer of 2013?

My study of these four cases has shown that the conditions for hierarchical dissonance in values between the priorities of the rulers for stability and of the ruled for economic justice and democracy were rife across the region during the Arab Spring of 2011. But they were rendered less acute in Morocco and Jordan as the kings in these countries resorted to religion as a palliative, because they genuinely believed in it and because they imbued their other diversionary methods of co-optation, repression and illiberal democracy in it. On the other hand, in the more secular republics of Tunisia and Egypt, the rulers made short shrift of religion, resulting in an intolerable dissonance between the hierarchies of the rulers and the ruled. Their diversionary tactics of co-optation, repression and illiberal democracy were hence perceived as insincere, opportunistic and, most of all, unjust. The only way left for the protesters was to overthrow these secular rulers and attempt to take matters into their own hands by attempting to transition towards democracy.

Moreover, the role of the military is important in all four cases. I suggested that, as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and hence as legitimate ‘Commanders of the Faithful’, the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchs retained and commanded the support of their militaries. In Tunisia and in Egypt, by contrast, the military proved to be fickle, changing sides and abandoning the rulers, especially since these rulers, unlike the kings, decided to use excessive force against their own people, from which the military conscripts and officers emanated. While it is true that both Ben Ali and Mubarak were military generals, they had alienated their base. Ben Ali had demoted his military to second-class positions, and emphasised and rewarded instead his security and intelligence services.