A PROTOTYPE of the nontranscendental type is to be found in the philosophy of Aristotle. According to Aristotle, there are certain characteristics, in particular, certain activities and powers, which are distinctive of man, and the life of the good man will exemplify to the fullest degree the development of those powers and activities. Or, more accurately, there is one distinctive feature of man – his ability to shape his actions and dispositions by reason – which will be manifested in the highest degree; other of his potentialities will, under the ordering power of reason, be realized in a balanced way and not each maximally. Practical reason is supposed to produce coherence, and reduce conflict, among the desires of the individual living (as man must live) in society. This aim of reducing conflict between desires, while not inordinately suppressing them, is part of what gives recognizable content to the claim that the aim of the sort of life outlined in Aristotle's system is happiness.

The importance of the harmonization of desires in Aristotle, and of practical reason in securing this, is illustrated in a backhanded way by his notable failure to deal with one problem of reconciliation which, in his own terms, must be important. The ‘reason’ that we have so far referred to is practical reason, which applies to particular actions and desires and which is the ground of what Aristotle (or rather his translators) call ‘virtues of character’ – that is to say, those dispositions to right action which involve motivations of pleasure and pain.