Very few issues regarding intelligence and accountability have come so suddenly into public view as the role of judiciary and its role in the oversight of intelligence. This began with questions about decisions made during the George W. Bush administration, when changes to the statutory framework were implemented in the name of expeditiousness and executive authority. This concern also increased under the Obama administration, as the breadth, depth, and targets of domestic surveillance programs became publicly known because of extensive leaks. Most recently, the Edward Snowden leaks have led to wide-ranging consideration of whether the National Security Agency (NSA) programs described in his leaked materials are legal, and if so, how; and if vetted through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, how were the legal questions answered? Concern about the legality of statutory changes and effectiveness of intelligence oversight in the judiciary has significant merit, and the discourse about it has always been extremely polarizing. The concern tends to be due to a lack of clarity and information and an absence of balance in the narratives regarding this issue.

Technological advances and the characteristics of conflict with non-state actors have forced changes in judicial oversight that are not present to the same degree in congressional oversight.