The year 1943 was a transitional one for the Americans fighting in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and South Pacific Area (SOPAC). In the former, SWPA forces – led by General Douglas MacArthur – had secured Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, by gaining control of Buna and Sanananda, thus preventing any further Japanese attempts to gain control of Port Moresby via the Kokoda Trail. In SOPAC, forces under the command of Admiral William F. Halsey took a bit longer to secure the largest island in the Solomon Islands, Guadalcanal. By February 1943, collectively the two commands – which included significant Australian effort – had turned back the Japanese attempt to sever the lines of communication between Australia and the United States.

In addition to achieving this strategic objective, the campaigns had served two other purposes. First, these two victories represented a psychological victory over the heretofore seemingly unstoppable Japanese forces. US soldiers in SWPA had finally prevailed against an adversary who, almost a year previously, forced a humiliated General Douglas MacArthur to flee the Philippines in defeat. Although this was no showcase for American combat effectiveness, it provided certain necessary intangible benefits. While admitting ‘that our job is still before us, with many of its difficulties’, I US Corps commander Robert L. Eichelberger nevertheless admitted to his wife that he was frustrated for not getting the attention he believed he had earned: ‘One must be satisfied in a large degree in the knowledge of duty well performed. One would have a hard time convincing the many who were here, including my staff and numerous newspaper men, that I failed in any way’.