Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-n9wrp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T13:15:53.238Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Chapter 7 - Operations in Afghanistan, 2001–02

from Part 3

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2015

John Blaxland
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
Get access

Summary

On 11 September 2001 John Howard was in Washington DC, having celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the ANZUS Alliance the day before at Washington's Navy Yard. The experience of being in Washington at that time left a very strong impression on him, and within three days he invoked the mutual defence clauses of the ANZUS Treaty, for the first time. The United States quickly identified Afghanistan as the primary target, being the state ruled by the Taliban and closely associated with the terrorist group Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden. The Taliban's refusal to expel Al Qaeda triggered the allied attacks aimed at their overthrow. The attacks began on 7 October, and by 12 November the capital, Kabul, had fallen to the Northern Alliance, the US-led coalition's principal Afghan allies against the Taliban.

Operations Bastille, Slipper and Falconer

Despite still having considerable forces on operations elsewhere, the Australian Government decided to support US-led combat operations in Afghanistan under Operation Slipper. But with troops in East Timor, Solomon Islands and other potential hot spots being watched in Australia's region, the government was reluctant to make large commitments to a far-away conflict that might have left it unable to respond appropriately to regional contingencies. Recognising the imperative to make a meaningful contribution, Howard sought to keep the initial contribution contained and time-constrained. In keeping with the approach taken since Whitlam's military disengagement from Singapore and Vietnam in the mid-1970s, Howard wanted to avoid being embroiled in longer-term fighting, reconstruction or ‘messy nation building’, preferring instead ‘a surgical operation with a finite duration’. That ultimately meant the special forces were the only viable option.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×