According to Steven Heydemann at the United States Institute of Peace, who was writing prior to the Arab uprisings, democracy assistance in the Middle East has failed. Instead of promoting reform, he argues that international efforts have shaped strategies of authoritarian survival, creating a situation in which rulers adopt the language but not the substance of democracy. King Abdullah of Jordan, who held onto power more easily than other Arab leaders during the upheavals of 2011, has been especially adept at this strategy. His approach blended promises to reform and government shake-ups at home with pleas for more aid to sustain his regime abroad.

Heydemann is not alone in his pessimistic assessments of democracy aid in the Middle East. But why have external actors promoted democracy in the ways they have if Arab dictators know how to use elections and other seemingly democratic institutions to their advantage? To design more effective democracy assistance, it is important to understand what factors cause democracy promoters to select certain programs and not others in the first place.

To understand the factors that shape democracy assistance in the Middle East and beyond, this chapter presents a case study of Jordan between 2008 and 2012. It tests the theory I laid out in Chapter 2 using evidence drawn from more than seventy-five semi-structured interviews, participant observation, organizational materials, news articles, and secondary research.