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5 - Two Mechanisms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 October 2011

Mark Dincecco
Affiliation:
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca
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Summary

Political transformations had important effects on sovereign credit risk. Both fiscal centralization and limited government typically led to notable improvements in yield spreads. But by what means? So far, the analysis does not identify the precise mechanisms by which institutional changes led to credit gains. This chapter analyzes two channels through which risk reductions occurred: increases in government revenues per head and improvements in fiscal prudence.

Ferguson (2006) argues that there is a dearth of information about European macroeconomic conditions before the 1870s. Budgetary figures are one unique source of data that are readily available across countries. The first mechanism concerns the amount of tax revenues that national governments collected on a per capita basis. The key conceptual reason to scale by population rather than by some measure of national production is to capture the state’s ability to extract tax revenues per head, and not government size relative to that of the economy. There is, moreover, an issue of feasibility. As Ferguson (2006) notes, nineteenth-century GDP measures were still in their infancy, and modern reconstructions of pre-1815 GDP levels tend toward educated guesses at best (see Acemoglu et al., 2005).

Type
Chapter
Information
Political Transformations and Public Finances
Europe, 1650–1913
, pp. 43 - 63
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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  • Two Mechanisms
  • Mark Dincecco
  • Book: Political Transformations and Public Finances
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139013345.005
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  • Two Mechanisms
  • Mark Dincecco
  • Book: Political Transformations and Public Finances
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139013345.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Two Mechanisms
  • Mark Dincecco
  • Book: Political Transformations and Public Finances
  • Online publication: 07 October 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139013345.005
Available formats
×