In this book I have used the terms reason and philosophy without attempting to provide formal definitions for them, and without trying to defend my understanding of the way these words should be used against the many other interpretations that are possible. This is not because I think such definitions and such a defense are unimportant. On the contrary, I think we are going to find it very difficult to come to an understanding of what the Hebrew Bible is about and what it does (and does not) have to teach us without a precise understanding of what reason is. But after a number of attempts at introducing such formal definitions into the body of this work, I came to the conclusion that I couldn’t integrate this material without creating more problems – for myself and for my readers – than I was solving. In particular, I found that an extended elaboration and defense of my views on the nature of reason necessarily led me far from the main subjects this book was intended to cover. Whereas a cursory discussion could only leave readers with the impression that what I have to say on this subject is superficial and fails to do it justice.

Nevertheless, because of the importance of the topic, I don’t feel right completely abandoning those readers who feel they need a more sharply drawn picture of what I am talking about when I speak of reason and philosophy. For those readers, I’ve included this appendix, whose content is precisely a superficial treatment of the subject that fails to do it justice – no more and no less. These few pages are aimed only at providing the barest outline of what I think needs to be said about what I take to be the nature of human reason. They give a general direction, which a few readers, perhaps, may find useful. Filling out this bare outline in a way that is systematic and persuasive is something I will have to do elsewhere.