This appendix includes a selection of additional sources that readers may wish to consult. These references provide an indication of the variety present in the political economy of public sector governance literature. In many cases, the referenced articles speak to multiple themes in the text, but they are categorized by at least one major focus.

CHAPTER I

Institutions and Organizations

Bernstein, L. (2001). Private commercial law in the cotton industry: Creating cooperation through rules, norms, and institutions. Michigan Law Review, 99:1724–1790.

Milgrom, P., North, D. C., and Weingast, B. R. (1990). The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The medieval law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. Economics and Politics, 1:1–23.

Moe, T. M. (1984). The new economics of organization. American Journal of Political Science, 28:739–777.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.

Weingast, B., and Marshall, W. (1988). The industrial-organization of Congress: or,why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy, 96:132–163.

Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting. Free Press, New York.

Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. Oxford University Press, New York.

Policy Expertise

Bertelli, A. M., and Wenger, J. B. (2009). Demanding information: Think tanks and the US congress. British Journal of Political Science, 39:225–242.

Esterling, K. M. (2001). The political economy of expertise. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.