Violence is a loaded word. Its use often dictates the direction of thought. While noble objectives may sometimes legitimate violence, by the same token violence may sometimes delegitimate those goals. The caché of any ideal may be placed in jeopardy by its mere association with violence. Only consider the phrase “Reign of Terror.” In many minds, that is enough to undercut the ostensibly justifiable aims of even an egalitarian revolt, such as the French Revolution of 1789.

Clearly, there is something unsettling about the specter of violence and language that validates it. This is especially true in the context of dissent. For when it runs in tandem with violence, dissent may all too easily be severed from its definitional moorings. This is not, however, to deny that there may be a place for violence in the conceptual cabin of dissent. It is only to stress the importance of proceeding with caution.

Let us continue, if only for the purpose of utility, with the Oxford English Dictionary definition of “violence.” At a high level of abstraction, violence is characterized as “the 50 exercise of physical force so as to cause injury or damage to a person or property.” Not surprisingly, what this explanation elides are gradations of harm; definitionally, it is as though all violence is created equal. But such cannot be the case for any sober and profound understanding of dissent. Whether violent conduct is likely to be considered an act of dissent may depend on its placement in the full spectrum of violence, running from petty damage to property and minor injury to person on the one end to terrorism and assassination on the other end.