Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Map 1
- Map 2
- Map 3
- Map 4
- Map 5
- Map 6
- Map 7
- Map 8
- Introduction
- 1 The dominance of air and sea production
- 2 The air and sea war and the phases of equipment destruction
- 3 The air and sea war to November 1940
- 4 Grand strategists and the air and sea war
- 5 Understanding the air and sea war from December 1940 to March 1942
- 6 Grand strategy in action: prioritizing the air and sea war
- 7 Winning the shipping war
- 8 The war in Europe in 1943: strategic bombing and the land war
- 9 The war in Europe in 1944
- 10 The air and sea war against Japan, 1942–4
- 11 The end of the war
- Conclusion: the supremacy of air and sea power and the control of mobility
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
10 - The air and sea war against Japan, 1942–4
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Map 1
- Map 2
- Map 3
- Map 4
- Map 5
- Map 6
- Map 7
- Map 8
- Introduction
- 1 The dominance of air and sea production
- 2 The air and sea war and the phases of equipment destruction
- 3 The air and sea war to November 1940
- 4 Grand strategists and the air and sea war
- 5 Understanding the air and sea war from December 1940 to March 1942
- 6 Grand strategy in action: prioritizing the air and sea war
- 7 Winning the shipping war
- 8 The war in Europe in 1943: strategic bombing and the land war
- 9 The war in Europe in 1944
- 10 The air and sea war against Japan, 1942–4
- 11 The end of the war
- Conclusion: the supremacy of air and sea power and the control of mobility
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
In 1944 the Imperal Japanese Navy controlled one of the largest striking forces available to the Axis. When a census was taken of the aircraft on hand for operations on April 1, it was found that the IJN had 1,854 fighters, 930 bombers and 1,104 assorted other support aircraft. Qualitatively, many of these aircraft were superior to those produced months earlier. Starting in late 1943, the Zero Type 52 was sent to the navy in large numbers. This updated model of Japan's most famous fighter, considered its most effective variation, had been re-engineered to meet the American navy's F-6F Hellcat and F-4U Corsair carrier-based fighters. In shipping terms, the Japanese navy still retained a large fleet with an impressive mix of ships. Admiral Ozawa, who commanded the Mobile Fleet when the Battle of the Philippine Sea commenced, had nine different aircraft carriers which could launch a combined 473 aircraft. As well as the carriers, this striking force had the two largest battleships in the world (Yamato and Musashi), four other battleships, eleven excellent heavy cruisers and thirty destroyers.
The number one priority for this force of aircraft and ships was the defense of the Mariana Islands, most famously Saipan, Tinian and Guam. By way of comparison, the Japanese navy had access to many times more aircraft than the Luftwaffe had assigned to the defense of Army Group Center in the summer of 1944. The Marianas were the linchpin of Japan's defensive perimeter and had been the focus of Japanese planning for months. The Japanese navy realized that their striking force would still be smaller than the approaching American fleet possessing seven fleet aircraft carriers and eight light carriers which could launch a combined 900 aircraft. To counterbalance this inferiority, the Japanese stationed an additional 540 land-based aircraft within range of the Marianas.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- How the War Was WonAir-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II, pp. 374 - 429Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015